

Secure PostgreSQL Deployments

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There's much to security

- Identify the threats
- Apply the *correct* measures
 - Don't do things just because you can

Not in this talk

- Application security
- Data Access Control
- Data Encryption
- etc
- etc

Definitely not in this talk

- Unix vs Windows
- Linux vs BSD
- SELinux/SEPostgreSQL
- Any other religion

In this talk!

- Authentication methods
- Connection security

Authentication methods

- How do we determine who the user is
- *When* do we determine who the user is

pg_hba.conf

- Lets you use different auth methods from different clients
- Not just limited to username/password
- For convenience or security
- Internal or external

pg_hba.conf

```
local    all         all                                     trust
host     all         all          127.0.0.1/32      trust
host     webdb       webuser     10.0.0.0/24      md5
host     all         @dba       192.168.0.0/24   gss
```


Trust Authentication

- Any user can be anyone he/she claims to be!

Trust Authentication

- Any user can be anyone he/she claims to be!
- Anyone think this is a bad idea?

Username/password


- Normally, use *md5* method
 - crypt has been removed, avoid plaintext
- What everybody does
- What everybody *expects*

LDAP authentication

- To the client, username/password
- Backend verification is off-loaded to directory server
- Common in enterprise deployments
- Password policies, expiry, etc

LDAP authentication

- Single *password* not single *signon*



LDAP news in 9.0

- search/bind combination
- Can use non-cn fields in login
 - Anything that's LDAP searchable
 - Common choice: uid

RADIUS (new in 9.0)


- Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
- Simple single-packet UDP service
- Original use-case: ISP dialup
- Common for one-time passwords, etc
- Good policy frameworks

Kerberos/GSSAPI/SSPI

- Single *signon*
- Same benefits as LDAP (mostly)
- Most common: Active Directory
- («krb5» is deprecated)

Kerberos/GSSAPI/SSPI

- Single *password* not single *signon*



PAM

- Provided by OS
- Can do password, LDAP, etc
- Can also do Kerberos & friends
- One-time passwords
 - RSA SecurID, Vasco, etc
 - RADIUS (no need in 9.0)

SSL

SSL secured connections

- Encryption
- Man-in-the-middle protection
- Authentication

SSL secured connections

- Enabled on the server (ssl=yes)
 - Platform quirks!
- Optionally required through pg_hba
- Optionally required in libpq


SSL secured connections

- Need to protect data in *both* directions
- For example username/password
- Must *know* before connection is started
 - Unknown equals unprotected


SSL encryption

- *SSL always* requires a server certificate
- Can be self-signed
- Does not need to be known by client


Certificate chains




Certificate chains



SSL secured connections



Threats handled by SSL: Eavesdropping




Eavesdropping

- Prevented by encrypting all data
- Key negotiation is automatic
 - On initial connection
 - After 512Mb traffic
- Server certificate used but not verified

Key renegotiation

- *Broken in the SSL protocol – OOPS!*
- Fixed SSL libraries *are* available
- Broken fixes were pushed by vendors
- `ssl_renegotiation_limit = 512MB`


Threats handled by SSL: Man in the middle



SSL server verification

- On top of encryption
- Validate that the server is who it claims to be
- CA issues certificate, can be self-signed
- CA certificate known by client


Threats handled by SSL: Man in the middle



SSL client authentication

- On top of encryption
- Normally on top of server verification, but not necessary
- CA issued certificate on *client*
- Match *CN* on certificate to user id
- Protect client certificate!

SSL client authentication



SSL client certificates

- Can also be used *together* with other authentication
- Require client certificate
- *Also* require e.g. username/password

SSL in libpq

- Controlled by *sslmode* parameter
- Or environment *PGSSLMODE*
- For security, must be set on client
 - Remember, *unknown* = *unsecure*

Summary of libpq SSL modes

Client Mode	Protect against		Compatible with server set to		Performance overhead
	Eavesdrop	MITM	SSL required	SSL disabled	
disable	no	no	FAIL	works	no
allow	no	no	works	works	If necessary
prefer	no	no	works	works	If possible
require	yes	no	works	FAIL	yes
verify-ca	yes	yes	works	FAIL	yes
verify-full	yes	yes	works	FAIL	yes

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Not a bad idea: ipsec

- If already deployed
- Application transparent
- Global policies
- Integrated management
- Somebody Else's Problem?

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Questions?

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