

Secure PostgreSQL Deployments

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There's much to security

- Identify the threats
- Apply the *correct* measures

Don't do things just because you can



Not in this talk

- Application security
- Data Access Control
- Data Encryption
- etc
- etc



Definitely not in this talk

- Unix vs Windows
- Linux vs BSD
- SELinux/SEPostgreSQL
- Any other religion



In this talk!

- Authentication methods
- Connection security



Authentication methods

- How do we determine who the user is
- When do we determine who the user is



pg_hba.conf

- Lets you use different auth methods from different clients
- Not just limited to username/password
- For convenience or security
- Internal or external



pg_hba.conf

local	all	all	trust
host	all	all 127.0.0.1/32	trust
host	webdb	webuser 10.0.0/24	md5



Trust Authentication

• Any user can be anyone he/she claims to be!



Trust Authentication

- Any user can be anyone he/she claims to be!
- Anyone think this is a bad idea?



Username/password

• Normally, use *md5* method

crypt has been removed, avoid plaintext

- What everybody does
- What everybody *expects*




LDAP authentication

- To the client, username/password
- Backend verification is off-loaded to directory server
- Common in enterprise deployments
- Password policies, expiry, etc



LDAP authentication

• Single *password* not single *signon*





LDAP news in 9.0

- search/bind combination
- Can use non-cn fields in login
 - Anything that's LDAP searchable
 - Common choice: uid



RADIUS (new in 9.0)

- Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
- Simple single-packet UDP service
- Original use-case: ISP dialup
- Common for one-time passwords, etc
- Good policy frameworks



Kerberos/GSSAPI/SSPI


- Single signon
- Same benefits as LDAP (mostly)
- Most common: Active Directory

• («krb5» is deprecated)



Kerberos/GSSAPI/SSPI

• Single *password* not single *signon*





PAM

- Provided by OS
- Can do password, LDAP, etc
- Can also do Kerberos & friends
- One-time passwords
 - RSA SecurID, Vasco, etc
 - RADIUS (no need in 9.0)







- Encryption
- Man-in-the-middle protection
- Authentication



• Enabled on the server (ssl=yes)

– Platform quirks!

- Optionally required through pg_hba
- Optionally required in libpq



- Need to protect data in *both* directions
- For example username/password
- Must know before connection is started

- Unknown equals unprotected




SSL encryption


- SSL *always* requires a server certificate
- Can be self-signed
- Does not need to be known by client




Certificate chains

















Eavesdropping

- Prevented by encrypting all data
- Key negotiation is automatic
 - On initial connection
 - After 512Mb traffic
- Server certificate used but not verified



Key renegotiation

- Broken in the SSL protocol OOPS!
- Fixed SSL libraries *are* available
- Broken fixes were pushed by vendors
- ssl_renegotiation_limit = 512MB






SSL server verification

- On top of encryption
- Validate that the server is who it claims to be
- CA issues certificate, can be selfsigned
- CA certificate known by client








SSL client authentication

- On top of encryption
- Normally on top of server verificateion, but not necessary
- CA issued certificate on *client*
- Match CN on certificate to user id
- Protect client certificate!



SSL client authentication





SSL client certificates

- Can also be used *together* with other authentication
- Require client certificate
- *Also* require e.g. username/password



SSL in libpq

- Controlled by sslmode parameter
- Or environment *PGSSLMODE*
- For security, must be set on client

- Remember, unknown = unsecure



Protect against		Compatible with server set		Performance	
Client Mode	Eavesdrop	MITM	SSL required	SSL disabled	overhead
disable	no	no	FAIL	works	no
allow	no	no	works	works	If necessary
prefer	no	no	works	works	If possible
require	yes	no	works	FAIL	yes
verify-ca	yes	yes	works	FAIL	yes
verify-full	yes	yes	works	FAIL	yes



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Not a bad idea: ipsec

- If already deployed
- Application transparent
- Global policies
- Integrated management
- Somebody Elses Problem?



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Questions?

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